During Richard Nixon's first term as president, the economy faced another unemployment problem. The economy was coming out of a recession that had started in Table 2 provides information on the growth rates for M1, M2 and real GDP for 1970-1972 . M1 growth increased in each of the three years, starting at approximately 4.5 percent growth in 1970 and ending at slightly over 7.5 percent annualized growth over the first half of 1972.
M2 growth expanded even faster. Real growth in the economy was accelerating, too. In 1972, real GDP grew 7.7 percent and certainly helped Nixon in the election. 1971 and 1972 by showing some important interest rates. The discount rate started at 6.0 percent on January 1, 1970, and was lowered to 4.5 percent over the next two years. The discount rate played a more important role in monetary policy in 1971 than it did in recent times and usually was set below the federal funds rate.
Between January 1970 and July 1972, the federal funds rate dropped by over 4 percentage points and the 10-year Treasury rate dropped by 2.6 percentage points.
Additional evidence of an excessive monetary ease in 1971 and 1972 comes from inflation statistics for the years following the Burns-Nixon pre-election monetary expansion, shown in Table 3 . The Consumer Price Index inflation rate was 9.6 percent in 1973, 11.8 percent in 1974, and 6.7 percent in 1975. Thus, a monetary stimulus helped to boost the economy in time for the 1972 election, helping to deliver Nixon's landslide victory. However, the excessive aggregate demand stimulation prior to the election created serious problems for the economy that took nearly a decade to resolve. The remaining question, which will be discussed at the end of this paper, is whether Arthur Burns acceded to this unwise policy because of the political pressure from Richard Nixon that is manifested in the taped recordings, or whether he independently reached the conclusion that additional monetary stimulus was needed to get the economy back on track. Nixon, speaking to Burns, expresses his concern about the economy: "I don't want to go out of town fast," he said, apparently referring to the possibility of losing his upcoming reelection bid. Nixon tells Burns that "this will be the last Conservative administration in Washington," perhaps seeking to raise Burns's concerns that Nixon might lose the election. Nixon claims that the "liquidity problem," by which he seems to mean the problem of too much liquidity in the system, is "just bullshit." Burns states that monetary policy has produced "lots of liquidity" in the banking sector, suggesting that there may be a problem of too much liquidity. Burns discusses the various critics of the Fed's monetary policies whose views range from too tight to "gone wild." Burns seems to side with not needing much change in monetary policy: "I don't want to see interest rates exploding on the next … [garbled] . I could lose control of my Board." "Does this mean we're stuck then with a recession next year?" asks Nixon. "No, I predict recovery," replies Burns.
While Burns never explicitly defines "liquidity" in this conversation, he is probably referring to the availability of loanable funds in the banking sector or some monetary aggregate. Burns sees lots of liquidity in the banking sector and fears a rapid rise in interest rates coming from a rise in inflationary expectations if monetary policy is judged to have "gone wild." Nixon, on the other hand, is perturbed that liquidity isn't growing fast enough. Over the previous year from October 1, 1970 to October 1, 1971, the money supply had grown at a relatively expansionary 6.7 percent, but the increase had been slower in the second half of 1971. The money supply had increased at a 4.25 annual rate over the previous two months from August 1 to October 1, 1971. Committee. Burns states that "I wanted you to know that we lowered the discount rate……got it down to 4.5 percent." "Good, good, good," replies Nixon. Burns indicates that the announcement of the discount rate reduction would be accompanied by the usual statement that it was done in order to bring the rate into line with market conditions, but with an added statement that it was done to "also further economic expansion." Burns exclaims that he also lowered the rate to "put them [the Federal Open
Market Committee] on notice that through this action that I want more aggressive steps taken by that committee on ne xt Tuesday." "Great. Hayes] had felt that there was a great deal to be said for taking advantage of today's meeting to exchange views on the discount rate before any action was taken" and that Mr.
Hayes "was inclined to recommend to his directors that the New York Bank stay with its present discount rate until further clarification of the outlook." While the Board of Governors reviews and determines the discount rate, each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks "establishes" the rate. At the time of this FOMC meeting, only four of the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks had implemented the lower discount rates recommended by the Board, which suggests widespread doubts about a more expansionary monetary policy at this time.
December 24, 1971 (Conversation 17-5)
In a telephone conversation between Nixon and George Shultz, Nixon said to Shultz: "Do you feel, as far as Arthur [Burns] and the money supply, we got that about The emerging picture is that Nixon and Shultz fear that Burns is insufficiently enthusiastic about expanding the money supply, despite Burns's earlier explicit statements. Indeed, Nixon seems paranoid concerning Burns's loyalty. The economic data supports the view that the Federal Reserve had already become decidedly more expansionary as Burns had promised, and that Shultz and Nixon's suspicions about Burns were unwarranted. The federal funds rate had dropped in just over two months to 3.43 percent on a weekly average from its 4.59 percent weekly average ending on December 10. The 10-year Treasury rate had fallen to 6.08 percent from its rate of 6.34 percent on December 10. The money supply was now growing rapidly. Over the two months before this conversation, M1 grew an annualized rate of 10 percent and M2 at an annualized rate of 12.8 percent.
Additional evidence of Nixon's distrust of Burns comes from the fact that Malek, apparently Burns's top choice for the open Governor's position on the Board, was never nominated by Nixon. As Nixon had stated earlier (Conversation 17-5), he was not going to let Burns "name his people." Brimmer left the Board in 1974 after serving eight and one-half years.
February 14, 1972 (Conversation 670-7)
Nixon and Burns have a conversation that almost immediately follows the conversation above. Ehrlichman is reportedly present, but never speaks.
Nixon: "You say it's coming along and we had this six month period of an awful dry spell and I guess I'm not sure we may have hurt us irreparably." 
Discussion
The fact that President Nixon pressured Arthur Burns to run an expansionary monetary policy in the run-up to the 1972 election is well-known (for example, Tufte, 1978, pp. 45-50) . As another example, John Ehrlichman (1982, pp. 248-249) that is, the deliberate manipulation of monetary policy to stimulate the economy prior to an important election (Beck, 1987; Allen and McCrickard, 1991, Leertouwer and Maier, 2001; Price 1997) continued: "They [great numbers of citizens] know that even a gradual inflation distorts the calculation of profits and therefore can impair the growth of business on which they depend for their livelihood or advancement. They know that, without giving notice, a gradual inflation may stop being gradual, gather momentum, and eventually lead to depression and unemployment. Most importantly of all, they know that inflation is not an act of God, and they believe that a mature people should be able to conduct their private and public affairs so as to avoid depression and inflation."
It is hard to understand how a man of Arthur Burns's experience, intellect and political know-how could be pressured into abandoning his better judgment. An alternative explanation of Burns's actions holds that even though Nixon was suspicious and hectoring and paranoid toward Burns, Burns was nonetheless setting monetary policy according to his best judgment in a tumultuous macroeconomic time.
The recession that began in December 1969 and ended in November 1970 had done little to restrain inflation (as shown earlier in Table 3 ). In August 1971, Burns testified before Congress (as quoted in Romer and Romer, 2004, p. 140) : "A year or two ago it was generally expected that extensive slack in resource use, such as we have been experiencing, would lead to significant moderation in the inflationary spiral. This has not happened, either here or abroad. The rules of economics are not working in quite the way they used to." De Long (1997) writes: "Thus there is a very real sense in which monetary policy did not contain inflation in the early 1970s because it was not tried. And it was not tried because the Chairman of the Federal Reserve did not believe it would work."
As an alternative approach to monetary restraint to combat inflation, Burns had started to advocate in May 1970 an "incomes policy" --that is, a policy of wage and price controls. Burns's advocacy of this policy shows that he retained considerable political independence, since such a policy was at first strongly opposed by Nixon's team at the Council of Economic Advisers, headed by Herb Stein, and also originally opposed by Nixon (De Long, 1997) . In effect, Burns turned over management of inflation to wage and price controls, at least for a time after they were first enacted in August 1971, which left him free to focus monetary policy on reducing unemployment. Further, many reputable economists argued that the unemployment rate, which was hovering around 6 percent, indicated that there was considerable slack in the economy (DeLong, 1997) 
